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KATRINA AND THE RHETORIC OF FEDERALISM
Christina E. Wells*
I. INTRODUCTION
The public's desire to assign blame for government's inadequate re-
sponse to Hurricane Katrina has largely focused on the federal govern-
ment's slow and seemingly inept response to the storm.' In their own
defense, federal officials cast federalism-the system that divides power
among federal, state, and local governments-as the main culprit underly-
ing their inadequate response to hurricane victims.' Had power and au-
thority not been split among three different units of government, the
argument goes, the federal government might have been able to act more
quickly to save lives and prevent suffering. In effect, federal authorities
claim to have been hamstrung by a federalist system that relies on states
and localities as first responders.
As a consequence, some officials have called for greater federal con-
trol of disaster response and relief efforts. President Bush, for example,
argued "that a challenge on this scale requires greater federal authority and
a broader role for the armed forces-the institution of our government
most capable of massive logistical operations on a moment's notice."3 Sim-
ilarly, the White House Report regarding Katrina noted:
* Enoch H. Crowder Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law. Sarah
Baron provided valuable research assistance for this Article. The varied and thoughtful comments of
the many participants at the Mississippi College School of Law Hurricane Katrina Symposium greatly
added to this essay.
1. See, e.g., Terry M. Neal, Why, Oh Why?, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2005, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/05/AR2005090500482-pf.html; Todd S. Purdum,
Across U.S., Outrage at Response, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2005, at A5, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2005/09/03/nationaU/nationalspecial/3voices.htm?ex=1283400000&en=aa8fe67000016b3d&ei=509
0&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss; Bob Schieffer, Commentary, Government Failed the People, CBS.
com, Sept. 4, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/O9/O6/opinion/schieffer/main8l8486.shtml.
2. See, e.g., Eric Lipton et al., Political Issues Snarled Plans for Troop Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8,
2005, at A5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/O9/nationalnationalspecial/09military.html?ex
=1283918400&en=aa642c94881e7c01&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss; Scott Shane et al., After Fail-
ures, Government Officials Play Blame Game, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at A2, available at http:Ilwww.
nytimes.com/2005/09/05/national/nationalspecial/05blame.html?ex=1283572800&en=ldl4ebfbd942a7dO
&ei=5090; Stephen M. Griffin, Stop Federalism Before It Kills Again: Reflections on Hurricane Katrina,
Mar. 2006, http://ssrn.com/abstract=894470. To be sure, few people blame only federalism. Even Secre-
tary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff listed the federal government's deficiencies as part of the
problem. Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff Before the United States House
Select Committee on Hurricane Katrina, 109th Cong. (Oct. 19, 2005) (statement of Homeland Security
Secretary Michael Chertoff), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/testimony/testimony_0042.shtm.
Similarly, state and local officials shoulder some of the responsibility as well. Allen G. Breed, Who's to
Blame for Katrina's Aftermath?, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 19, 2006, available at http://www.boston.com/
news/nation/articles/2006/08/19/whos to blame for-stateof neworleans/?pl=MEWellPos3.
3. President George W. Bush, President Discusses Hurricane Relief in Address to the Nation,
(Sept. 16, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/O9/print/20050915-8.html; see also
Shane, supra note 2, (quoting Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff as saying that "in the
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
Our decades-old system, built on the precepts of federalism,
has been based on a model whereby local and State govern-
ments wait to reach their limits and exhaust their resources
before requesting Federal assistance.... In other words, the
system was biased toward requests and the concept of
"pull" rather than toward anticipatory reactions and the
proactive "push" of Federal resources.
While this approach has worked well in the majority of
disasters and emergencies, catastrophic events like Hurri-
cane Katrina are a different matter. The current homeland
security environment . . . now demands that the Federal
government actively prepare and encourage the Nation as a
whole to plan, equip, train, and cooperate for all types of
future emergencies, including the most catastrophic.4
And just recently, federal officials convinced members of Congress
that the problems associated with Katrina were sufficiently associated with
a lack of federal power to warrant legislation allowing the President to take
control of the National Guard in the event of a natural disaster or other
catastrophe.5
These calls for greater centralization of authority assume both that too
much power regarding disaster preparedness and response lies with states
and localities and that the lack of centralized federal power was a substan-.
tial cause of the federal government's apparently ineffective response to
the Katrina disaster. Neither assumption is wholly true. First, although
federal, state, and local governments share responsibility for disaster relief
and preparedness, the federal government retained substantial authority
and control over such efforts prior to Hurricane Katrina.6 Second, subse-
quent reports suggest that the biggest contributor to the government's inef-
fective response to Katrina was not lack of power but, rather, the federal
government's failure adequately to exercise its existing powers.7
future federal authorities need to take 'more of an upfront role earlier on, when we have these truly
ultracatastrophes."'); Bill Walsh, Plan Would Let President Take Control in Disasters, TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Oct. 22, 2005, at 2 (quoting presidential aide Frances Townsend as "considering whether there is a
,narrow band of cases' in which the President should take over.").
4. FRANCES FRAGOS TOWNSEND, THE WHITE HOUSE, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRI-
CANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 66 (2006).
5. See John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-
364, 120 Stat. 2083 (2006), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?cl09:H.R.5122; Dan Balz,
Governors Oppose Federal Control of the Guard, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2006, at A2, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/13/AR2006081300606.html.
6. See infra part III.
7. SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO
HURRICANE KATRINA, 109TH CONG., FINAL REP.: A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, 2d Sess., at 131-46
(2006), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html [hereinafter FAILURE OF INITIATIVE];
DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., A PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF FEMA's DISAS-
TER MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES IN RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA (2006), available at http://www.
dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/OIG_- 06-32_MarO6.pdf [hereinafter DHS PERFORMANCE REVIEW]; U.S.
GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-442T, HURRICANE KATRINA: GAO's PRELIMI-
NARY OBSERVATIONS REGARDING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY (2006), available at
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How is it that the federal government can possess yet credibly claim
(at least superficially) to be deprived of the very power that it needs to act
in disaster response and relief situations? One would think that the inher-
ent contradiction in such a state of affairs makes obvious the flaw in the
federal government's arguments. Much of the answer to this conundrum
lies in the system of "cooperative federalism" upon which our disaster re-
lief and preparedness programs are built. Unlike traditional dual federal-
ism, which envisions distinct spheres of authority, cooperative federalism
involves a system in which the federal, state, and local governments share
authority. This scheme of governance aims to carry out federal policy and
gives state and local governments some minimal federal guidance while al-
lowing them the adaptability to implement programs as they see fit.8
While cooperative federalism offers great flexibility and benefit to all
involved, it is also subject to manipulation and abuse by federal officials.
With programs created under this system, federal officials can pay lip ser-
vice to federalist principles while nevertheless retaining (or consolidating)
substantial power and imposing substantive policy on other governmental
entities. Because such programs are thought of as "federalist," problems
that arise can then be blamed on states or localities rather than seen as
missteps of the federal government. The aftermath of the Katrina relief
effort reveals such manipulation by federal officials-e.g., in their claims to
have been hamstrung by federalism when they actually had substantial au-
thority to act. Given this potential for manipulation, society should be
wary of calls by federal officials for substantial centralization of authority
simply because "federalism" failed. Decisions to alter the federal govern-
ment's role in disaster relief and response should occur in the context of a
concrete assessment of the Katrina relief effort's flaws rather than in re-
sponse to vague assertions of failed principles.
Part II of this Article discusses the concept of cooperative federalism.
Part III discusses the statutory and administrative framework that governs
disaster relief and response, including the manner in which that framework
fits within cooperative federalism. Finally, Part IV discusses recent find-
ings regarding the federal government's response to the Katrina disaster
and how they reflect the potential perils of cooperative federalism
programs.
II. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
Although "venerated" in American legal and political circles,9 "feder-
alism" is an amorphous concept. Most of us can define it on a general level
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06442t.pdf [hereinafter GAO PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS] (testi-
mony of Comptroller General David M. Walker before the Senate Homeland Security and Govern-
mental Affairs Committee).
8. See Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79
N.C. L. REV. 663, 668 (2001).
9. See Mark C. Gordon, Differing Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constructing a New Approach to
Federalism in Congress and the Court, 14 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 187, 190 (1996) (noting that the
concept "has been referred to proudly as 'Our Federalism"' and listing other glowing references).
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as a form of political organization in which the system of power is divided
between a central government and territorial subdivisions such as states
and localities.1" After that, however, there exists little agreement as to
what the term federalism encompasses or should encompass. The tradi-
tional view of federalism-one often seen in Supreme Court cases-fo-
cuses on "dual federalism," which views "each jurisdiction as a separate
entity that regulates in its own distinct sphere of authority without coordi-
nating with the other."" Some commentators argue that this is the only
version of federalism authorized by the Constitution.
1 2
Despite this traditional view of federalism, "cooperative federalism"
programs-those which share authority between various jurisdictions-
have increased in popularity since the 1970s.13 In such programs, the fed-
eral government sets forth minimum standards in federal statutes or regula-
tions but leaves the states with some discretion. These programs are
generally implemented in one of two ways. First, the federal government
may enact a statute or regulation with minimum national standards but
which allows states to enact more stringent standards.14 Many federal envi-
ronmental laws operate within such a framework. 5 Second, the federal
government may implement cooperative federalism programs through
monetary grants or other federal funding. In this situation, the federal gov-
ernment "relies on a federal regulatory agency to develop certain standards
for state agencies to follow when implementing the federal statutory
scheme that provides federal funding for the states."1 6 Federal benefits
programs, such as Medicaid, are examples of funding-based cooperative
federalism. 7
There are said to be multiple benefits of cooperative federalism. First,
cooperative federalism programs recognize that, in a country as large as the
10. See Answers.com, Federalism: Definition and Much More, http://www.answers.comltopic/
federalism (last visited Nov. 2, 2006).
11. Weiser, supra note 8, at 665. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999) ("The federal
system established by our Constitution preserves the sovereign status of the States."); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1996) ("[A]lthough the States surrendered many of their powers to the new
Federal Government, they retained 'a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.'").
12. See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 Miss. L.J. 557, 561 (2000).
13. Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the
Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1695 (2001); see also David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federal-
ism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2546-47 (2005) (discussing flurry of "new federalism" activity in recent
decade).
14. Weiser, supra note 8, at 668.
15. See John Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183,
1197-98 (1995) (discussing framework of environmental laws); United States v. New York, 505 U.S.
144, 167 (1992) (describing various environmental laws that fall within a framework of cooperative
federalism).
16. Weiser, supra note 8, at 668; see also Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delega-
tion of Federal Power, and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 205-06 (1997). For in-depth discus-
sions of the manner in which such programs work, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of
Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 813, 858-62 (1998); Super, supra note 13, at 2571-79.
17. Weiser, supra note 8, at 668.
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United States, federal officials cannot realistically manage policies on a na-
tional level and that state officials are in a better position to tailor federal
regulatory regimes to local conditions.18 Second, such programs promote
interstate competition that allows citizens to choose among competing ju-
risdictions, ultimately resulting in "better and more efficient policies that
maximize social welfare."19 Third, cooperative federalism programs pro-
mote experimentation by giving states discretion in the implementation of
federal policy. Such experimentation may result in improved overall stan-
dards as states and the federal government come to see what others have
done.2 ° Finally, some argue that delegating implementation to state and
local decision makers provides greater opportunity for citizen participation
and, thus, greater accountability."1
Cooperative federalism (along with its constituent programs) is not,
however, without its critics. Some note that such programs, especially
those that attach conditions to the receipt of funds, effectively coerce the
states into accepting unattractive conditions because the states are rarely in
a position to refuse such funding.2" Others argue that cooperative federal-
ism programs "reduce political transparency[,] obscure political responsi-
bility[,] and facilitate political blame-shifting" because the public can never
be sure which level of government is responsible for failures in government
programs." Still others argue that because these programs require states
to implement national policy, they entail a "concentration of political pow-
ers in the national government."24
The debate among proponents and critics of cooperative federalism is
unlikely to be resolved in the near future. Indeed, for every criticism, there
seems to be a response, counter-response, and so forth in a seemingly end-
less loop of argument regarding the costs and benefits of cooperative feder-
alism.25 Perhaps the answer is somewhere in between the two extremes.
There are benefits to shared authority-especially in a nation so large that
a single government authority cannot possibly undertake certain tasks. On
18. John P. Dwyer, The Role of State Law in an Era of Federal Preemption: Lessons fiom Envi-
ronmental Regulation, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 203 (1997); Sarnoff, supra note 16, at 213;
Weiser, supra note 13, at 1699-1700.
19. Sarnoff, supra note 16, at 213; Weiser, supra note 13, at 1700-01.
20. Weiser, supra note 13, at 1701-02. The notion of states as "laboratories of experimentation"
comes from an earlier federalism opinion of Justice Brandeis. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285
U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
21. Sarnoff, supra note 16, at 214; Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the
Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory
Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1232-33 (1997).
22. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911,
1935-59 (1995).
23. Greve, supra note 12, at 598.
24. JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FEDERALISM 1 (1992).
25. See, e.g., Hills, Jr., supra note 16, at 899 (responding to Baker's argument, supra note 22);
Weiser, supra note 8, at 671 (responding to Zimmerman's argument, supra note 24). There is also
extensive political science literature on cooperative federalism to which these citations do not do
justice.
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the other hand, without vigilance, such programs may indeed be abused-
either by a government official attempting to escape accountability for bad
decision making or by the federal government ostensibly abiding by feder-
alism principles while actually imposing rigid substantive policies on the
states and, thus, consolidating power. As with many things, the devil is in
the details rather than in the concept, which proved to be the case with the
federal government's response to Hurricane Katrina-a response that oc-
curred largely in the context of a cooperative federalism program.
III. THE STATUTORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK OF DISASTER
RESPONSE AND PREPAREDNESS
A. The Stafford Act
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
("Stafford Act")26 establishes the central statutory framework regarding
the federal government's response to disasters and emergencies in the
United States. The language and structure of the law clearly embody fed-
eralism principles. Congress intended the Stafford Act to "to provide an
orderly and continuing means of assistance by the Federal Government to
State and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to allevi-
ate the suffering and damage which result from such disasters."27 Thus, the
statute contemplates states and localities as having primary authority for
disaster relief and response, with the federal government serving in a sup-
plemental role. The Stafford Act further manifests federalism principles
through its restrictions on federal authority. Specifically, the President may
declare the existence of a "major disaster"2 or an "emergency" 29 (with
either designation triggering federal aid) only at the request of the gover-
nor of an affected state who finds that the disaster or emergency "is of such
severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of
the State and the affected local governments and that Federal assistance is
necessary.
30
Once federal disaster relief and response is activated, the Stafford Act
allows the President to authorize provision of certain aid depending on
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (2006).
27. Id. at § 5121(b).
28. Id. at § 5122(2). The Stafford Act defines a "major disaster" as "any natural catastrophe
(including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, winddriven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earth-
quake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire,
flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes
damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this chapter to
supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organi-
zations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby." Id.
29. Id. at § 5122(1). The Stafford Act defines an "emergency" as "any occasion or instance for
which, in the determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local
efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or
avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States." Id.
30. Id. at § 5170 (major disaster); id. at § 5191(a) (emergency). The Stafford Act allows the
President to act in an emergency without a gubernatorial request if primarily federal interests are at
stake. Id. at § 5191(b).
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whether the declaration involves a major disaster or an emergency. Desig-
nations of major disasters can involve lending general assistance-includ-
ing federal agency technical advice and advisory assistance, coordination
and support efforts, the provision of health and safety information and
warnings, and food and medical supplies.3 In addition, essential assistance
designed to "meet[ ] immediate threats to life and property" is available-
including provision of equipment, personnel, medicine, and food-as well
as authorization for federal personnel to perform certain tasks, such as
search and rescue and debris removal.32 The Stafford Act also includes a
specific section allowing the use of Department of Defense ("DOD") re-
sources and personnel for non-law enforcement activities "essential to the
preservation of life and property" if the governor of an affected state so
requests.33 A declaration of emergency makes available federal assistance
in a form similar to general assistance under major disasters.34
Although the President has primary authority under the Stafford Act,
the Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA") has long been the
entity charged with coordinating the federal response to major disasters
and emergencies. In fact, prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, FEMA was the
only agency with "large-scale disaster recovery monies and budget author-
ity."'35 Statutes still locate responsibility for administering the Stafford Act
and the Federal Response Plan in FEMA. 36 However, after the 9/11 ter-
rorist attacks, Congress enacted the Homeland Security Act,37 which cre-
ated the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") and transferred to it
all of FEMA's functions.38 Thus, FEMA has been absorbed into another
agency and is no longer free standing.
At first glance, this absorption seems to detract from the federalism
principles that underlie the Stafford Act's approach to disaster relief and
response. DHS's mission is primarily to "prevent terrorist attacks within
the United States; reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terror-
ism; minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks
that do occur within the United States; [and act ] . . . as a focal point re-
garding natural and manmade crises and emergency planning. ' 39 Although
there is a brief nod in this description to "natural crises," terrorism is
DHS's rather obvious focus. National security and terrorism are largely
considered issues of national policy rather than matters in which state and
31. Id. at § 5170a.
32. Id. at § 5170b.
33. Id. at § 5170b(c). The provision limits the use of DOD personnel and resources to ten days.
Id. at § 5170b(c)(1).
34. Id. at § 5192.
35. Richard Sylves & William R. Cumming, FEMA 's Path to Homeland Security: 1979-2003, 1 J.
HOMELAND SEC. & EMERGENCY MGMT. 1, 9 (2004). Much of FEMA's authority came from a con-
stantly changing combination of statutes, executive orders, and presidential directives. Id. at 5-7.
36. 6 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1) (2006).
37. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.).
38. 6 U.S.C. § 313(1).
39. Id. at § 111(1)(A)-(D).
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local governments play a significant role. 40 Thus, one could conclude that
the creation of DHS signals an abandonment of the federalism principles of
the Stafford Act. However, a closer look reveals that, even here, federal-
ism principles play a substantial role.
Perhaps most importantly, the Stafford Act still exists and applies to
natural disasters. Thus, although FEMA has been absorbed into an agency
with a broader focus, the agency responsible for administering the Stafford
Act 41 cannot simply ignore the triggering requirements discussed above,
absent additional legal authority to do so. As discussed below, such au-
thority may exist.42 But, as the next section explains, even that authority
exists in the context of a framework of cooperative federalism which envi-
sions federal, state, and local officials working together in "all hazards"
planning and response.
B. The National Response Plan
After the 9/11 attacks, both federal law 43 and Homeland Security Pres-
idential Directive Number Five ("HSPD-5") 44 required the Secretary of
Homeland Security to establish the National Response Plan ("NRP")-the
successor to the Federal Response Plan originally administered by
FEMA. 45 HSPD-5 made clear that the NRP's purpose was to "establish a
single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident management . . . to
ensure that all levels of government across the Nation have the capability
to work efficiently and effectively together, using a national approach to
domestic incident management. '46 HSPD-5 also made clear that, while the
NRPD was to implement national policy, it would adhere to federalism
principles:
The Federal Government recognizes the roles and re-
sponsibilities of State and local authorities in domestic inci-
dent management. Initial responsibility for managing
40. See, e.g., Ernest B. Abbott, Homeland Security in the 21st Century: New Inroads on the State
Police Power, 36 URn. LAWYER 837, 839-40 (2004).
41. The identity of this agency is admittedly not entirely clear. Different authorities seem to
locate responsibility variously in FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security. See infra notes
54-58 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
43. 6 U.S.C. § 312(6) (vesting responsibility in the Department of Homeland Security Secretary
for "consolidating existing Federal Government emergency response plans into a single, coordinated
national response plan").
44. Press Release, The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive[HSPD-5 (Feb.
28, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html [hereinafter
HSPD-5].
45. In accordance with federal law (see supra note 43), the NRP consolidated several existing
response plans, including the Federal Response Plan, the Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations,
the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, and the Initial National Response Plan. DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN ix (2004), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrarylassets/
NRPFullText.pdf.
46. HSPD-5, supra note 44, at (3).
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domestic incidents generally falls on State and local authori-
ties. The Federal Government will assist State and local au-
thorities when their resources are overwhelmed, or when
Federal interests are involved. The Secretary will coordi-
nate with State and local governments to ensure adequate
planning, equipment, training, and exercise activities. The
Secretary will also provide assistance to State and local gov-
ernments to develop all-hazards plans and capabilities, in-
cluding those of greatest importance to the security of the
United States, and will ensure that State, local, and Federal
plans are compatible.47
Much like the Stafford Act, federal officials envisioned the NRP as
part of a framework in which the federal government would provide direc-
tion, policy goals and assistance if needed, but state and local authorities
would be largely responsible for implementation of disaster relief and re-
sponse efforts. Furthermore, although the NRP is technically a plan for
federal officials-thus, not itself binding on the statesa 8-HSPD-5 makes
clear that state and local officials wanting to receive federal disaster
preparedness grants must agree to abide by federally imposed conditions
consistent with the NRP.49 Such a program design is consistent with coop-
erative federalism.
When published in December 2004, the NRP's structure and text con-
tinued to reflect federalism notions. According to the NRP, "[i]n the vast
majority of incidents, State and local resources and interstate mutual aid
normally provide the first line of emergency response and incident manage-
ment support. ' '5' Accordingly, the NRP contemplates that "incidents are
generally handled at the lowest jurisdictional level possible. Police, fire,
public health and medical, emergency management, and other personnel
are responsible for incident management at the local level. ' '51 The NRP
recognizes, however, that some events-termed "Incidents of National Sig-
nificance"-will require greater federal coordination.
47. Id. at (6).
48. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 45, at 3 ("This plan is applicable to all Federal depart-
ments and agencies that may be requested to provide assistance or conduct operations in actual or
potential Incidents of National Significance.").
49. HSPD-5, supra note 44, at (20) ("Beginning in Fiscal Year 2005, Federal departments and
agencies shall make adoption of the NIMS a requirement, to the extent permitted by law, for providing
Federal preparedness assistance through grants, contracts, or other activities. The Secretary shall de-
velop standards and guidelines for determining whether a State or local entity has adopted the
NIMS."); see also Abbott, supra note 40, at 844-45. NIMS, or the National Incident Management
System, is designed to provide "a consistent nationwide template" to enable all levels of government
and private actors to work together to "prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from domestic
incidents." DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM iX (2004), availa-
ble at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIMS-90-web.pdf. The NRP is based on the NIMS frame-
work. Id.; DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 45, at i, 1.
50. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 45, at 15.
51. Id. at 15.
2006]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
The NRP defines Incidents of National Significance as "those high-
impact events that require a coordinated and effective response by an ap-
propriate combination of Federal, state, local, tribal, private-sector and
nongovernmental entities in order to save lives, minimize damage, and pro-
vide the basis for long term community recovery and mitigation activi-
ties. ' '52 Specifically, the NRP bases its definition of Incidents of National
Significance on four criteria (which were originally set forth in HSPD-5):
1. A Federal department or agency acting under its own au-
thority has requested DHS.assistance;
2. State and local resources are overwhelmed and appropri-
ate state and local authorities have requested assistance;
3. More than one Federal department is involved in re-
sponding to an incident; or
4. The President has directed the Secretary of DHS to as-
sume responsibility for managing a domestic incident.53
The NRP locates in the Secretary of DHS the authority to declare an
Incident of National Significance.54 Once such an incident is declared, the
Secretary is authorized to convene the Interagency Incident Management
Group ("IIMG"), which is a group of experienced, "headquarters-level"
personnel from multiple agencies who are to "facilitate[ ] strategic Federal
domestic incident management for Incidents of National Significance" by
synthesizing information, resolving conflicts among entities, and providing
advice to the Secretary of DHS and the President. The NRP also gives
the Secretary of DHS the ability to designate a Principal Federal Official,
whose job is to "coordinate overall Federal incident management and assis-
tance activities across the spectrum of prevention, preparedness, response,
and recovery. "56
While the declaration of an Incident of National Significance seems to
centralize much activity at the federal level, the NRP still contemplates
that, in many situations involving states and localities, the federalism prin-
ciples which govern the Stafford Act will also operate. Thus, the NRP spe-
cifically notes that "[f]or Incidents of National Significance that are
Presidentially declared disasters or emergencies, Federal support to States
is delivered in accordance with relevant provisions of the Stafford Act."57
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id. at 4; see also HSPD-5, supra note 44, at (4).
54. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 45, at 4.
55. Id. at 22.
56. Id. at 33.
57. Id. at 7.
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In such instances, then, although Incidents of National Significance are in-
volved, the NRP contemplates that federal officials, rather than taking con-
trol of the situation, will act only at the request of governors who need
aid.58
There is, however, a provision in the NRP allowing the President to
act even without a gubernatorial request if a catastrophic incident has oc-
curred that requires immediate federal action. Under the Catastrophic In-
cident Annex to the NRP, the federal government, through the Secretary
of DHS, can take an "accelerated, proactive response to a catastrophic inci-
dent."59 Such an incident is defined as:
[A]ny natural or manmade incident .. .that results in ex-
traordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption
severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environ-
ment, economy, national morale and/or government func-
tions. A catastrophic incident could result in sustained
national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost
immediately exceeds resources available to the State, local,
tribal, and private-sector authorities in the impacted area,
and significantly interrupts governmental operations and
emergency services to such an extent that national security
could be threatened. All catastrophic incidents are Inci-
dents of National Significance.6"
Upon the Secretary of DHS's declaration of a catastrophic incident,
the federal government may move resources and take action without going
through the normal procedures regarding requests for assistance from state
officials. 6 '
IV. KATRINA, WHAT WENT WRONG, AND THE PERILS
OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
In any disaster of Katrina's magnitude, mistakes and failures occur at
all levels of government.62 Accordingly, it would be unreasonable to con-
clude that the federal government is solely responsible for the needless suf-
fering and damage that occurred. This statement is supported by several
58. Id. (noting only limited presidential pre-declaration response authority to move goods closer
to potentially affected area).
59. Id. at 339.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 44 ("Standard procedures regarding requests for assistance may be expedited or, under
extreme circumstances, suspended in the immediate aftermath of an event of catastrophic
magnitude.").
62. FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 7, at 1 ("The Select Committee identified failures at all
levels of government that significantly undermined and detracted from the heroic efforts of first re-
sponders, private individuals and organizations, faith-based groups, and others."). Of course, as the
committee's report points out, many people did things well too, including government actors. The
criticisms raised here are not meant to detract from the efforts of the thousands of individuals, including
those employed by federal, state, and local governments, who worked to help people in the aftermath
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investigations conducted after Katrina, which found that some states and
localities were only marginally successful in implementing the NRP; that
state and local officials did not effectively coordinate their responses with
federal officials; and that state National Guard unit response plans were
inadequate and not well coordinated with other National Guard units.63
However, the Bush administration has attempted to avoid responsibility
and centralize power by blaming a flawed framework of federalism. Con-
sequently, it is reasonable to review the investigative findings regarding the
federal government's response to determine if there is support for the Bush
administration's claims that its response was due to the lack of adequate
authority or that there was an inappropriate division of powers.
A review of those investigations shows that the federal government's
poor response was not due to a lack of adequate authority or an inappro-
priate division of powers among various levels of government. Rather, fed-
eral officials' failures to understand or utilize their existing powers were
substantial causes of the federal government's poor response. 64 For exam-
ple, a bipartisan congressional committee established to investigate the fed-
eral government's response to Katrina concluded that DHS Secretary
Michael Chertoff did not adequately utilize his authority under the Na-
tional Response Plan.65 Investigators found that Secretary Chertoff did not
convene the IIMG until thirty-six hours after Katrina made landfall, even
though he had the authority to do so much sooner in light of the presiden-
tial declaration of a major disaster under the Stafford Act (which made
Katrina an Incident of National Significance).66 Failure to convene the
of Hurricane Katrina. Rather, they are examples of flawed decision making by government officials in
charge of implementing the overall framework of disaster response.
63. DHS PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 7, at 19-22; U.S. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY OFFICE, GAO-06-643, HURRICANE KATRINA: BE'ITER PLANS AND EXERCISES NEEDED TO GUIDE
THE MILITARY'S RESPONSE TO CATASTROPHIC NATURAL DISASTERS 10 (2006), available at http://www.
gao.gov/new.items/d06643.pdf (Statement for the Record by Sharon Pickup, Director Defense Capabil-
ities and Management, to the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives). See also FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra
note 7, at 1 (noting that "[r]esponse plans at all levels of government lacked flexibility and adaptability"
delaying officials' responses to the hurricane); id. at 183-95 (discussing "command and control"
problems at all levels of government).
64. The criticisms listed in this essay represent merely a fraction of the discussion that appears in
these voluminous and very thorough reports. They are merely examples. For a more detailed discus-
sion, readers should consult the reports.
65. FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 7, at 132-35.
66. Id. Kathleen Blanco, the Governor of Louisiana, requested a declaration of emergency
under the Stafford Act on August 27, 2005. President Bush granted that request on the same day. See
Memorandum from Congressional Research Service to Honorable John Conyers, Jr., at 5-6 (Sept. 12,
2005), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary-democrats/crskatrinarept91205.pdf (discussing rele-
vant Stafford Act authorities and declarations relevant to Hurricane Katrina). On August 28, 2005,
Governor Blanco also requested an expedited declaration of major disaster, which President Bush
granted on August 29, 2005. Id. at 6-7. At the requests of the Governors of Mississippi and Alabama,
the President made declarations of emergency on August 28, 2005, and of major disaster on August 29,
2005. GAO PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS, supra note 7, at 6.
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IIMG earlier "robbed" federal officials "of the opportunity to receive pro-
fessional advice and strategic options for proactively addressing the un-
folding catastrophic disaster.
67
Secretary Chertoff similarly delayed declaring Katrina an Incident of
National Significance or designating a Principal Federal Official (the per-
son personally designated by the Secretary of DHS to direct the coordi-
nated federal response) until August 30, although he could have made such
designations as early as August 27-two days before Katrina made land-
fall. 68 Furthermore, his designation of FEMA Director Michael Brown as
Principal Federal Official-despite the fact that Brown had not completed
the required training-proved quite problematic. 69 These failures of lead-
ership had a significant effect on the federal government's response to Ka-
trina. In a preliminary report, the Comptroller General noted:
No one was designated in advance to lead the overall
federal response in anticipation of the event despite clear
warnings from the National Hurricane Center. Further-
more, events unfolded both before and immediately after
the landfall of Hurricane Katrina that made it clear that
governmental entities did not act decisively or quickly
enough to determine the catastrophic nature of the
incident....
Although the DHS Secretary designated a [Principal
Federal Official] . . ., the efforts of all federal agencies in-
volved in the response remained disjointed because the
[Principal Federal Official]'s leadership role was unclear. In
the absence of timely and decisive action and clear leader-
ship responsibility and accountability, there were multiple
chains of command, a myriad of approaches and processes
for requesting and providing assistance, and confusion
about who should be advised of requests and what resources
would be provided within specific time frames.7 °
The investigations also found that federal agencies had not developed
adequate operating plans prior to Katrina, which caused problems when
coordinating with other agencies to provide support in the emergent situa-
tion.7' Similarly, key federal officials lacked a competent understanding of
their duties and responsibilities. For example, in accordance with the NRP,
67. FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 7, at 135.
68. Id. at 133-35.
69. Id. at 135 (noting Brown's "concerned and confused" reaction to his appointment and the
fact that the NRP requires that all Principal Federal Officials complete training unless "extenuating
circumstances dictate otherwise").
70. U.S. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-365R, PRELIMINARY OBSERVA-
TIONS ON HURRICANE KATRINA: STATEMENT BY COMPTROLLER GENERAL DAVID M. WALKER ON
GAO's PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS REGARDING PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANES
KATRINA AND RITA 4 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06365r.pdf.
71. FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 7, at 144.
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the Principal Federal Official designated several Federal Coordinating Of-
ficers, whose job is to coordinate major disasters and emergencies declared
by the President under the Stafford Act and to ensure timely federal assis-
tance to affected states and localities. 72 According to one report, these of-
ficials' roles and responsibilities continually shifted, which resulted in
"disjointed efforts of many federal agencies involved in the response, a
myriad of approaches and processes for requesting and providing assis-
tance, and confusion about who should be advised of requests and what
resources would be provided within specific time frames. ' 73 Overlap in du-
ties and lack of understanding of agency and institutional roles was a com-
mon problem cited by the investigations.74
Perhaps most importantly, Secretary Chertoff failed to invoke the Cat-
astrophic Incident Annex. As the bipartisan congressional committee
noted, the NRP's Catastrophic Incident Annex "was specifically written for
a disaster such as Katrina," and "[i]t is clear that the consequences of Hur-
ricane Katrina exceeded all of these criteria and required a proactive re-
sponse. '75 Had DHS invoked the Catastrophic Incident Annex, federal
troops and other federal aid could have been moved to affected states days
earlier and without waiting for requests from states. Instead, such troops
did not arrive in significant numbers until several days after Hurricane Ka-
trina made landfall. 76 As a result of the federal government treating the
situation as a typical "pull" system (i.e., one in which the federal govern-
ment waits for formal requests) rather than a "push" system (i.e., a proac-
tive federal response as authorized by the Catastrophic Incident Annex),
informal requests for help went ignored.77 Certainly, portions of the re-
sponse effectively became a push system as various agencies acted on an ad
hoc basis, but valuable time was lost and such responses were haphazard.78
What does all of this say about the federal government's argument?
To the extent that it suggests that the division of power between federal,
state, and local authorities was a hindrance, there is certainly evidence that
coordination among various government entities and officials was a sub-
stantial problem. But this is hardly evidence that the concept of federalism
was at fault (if, indeed, there is such a thing as a unitary concept of federal-
ism-an admittedly dubious proposition). 79 Rather, the evidence shows
72. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 45, at 65.
73. GAO PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS, supra note 7, at 11; see also FAILURE OF INITIATIVE,
supra note 7, at 189.
74. FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 7, at 143-44 (noting that "[f]ederal agencies, including
DHS, had varying degrees of unfamiliarity with their roles and responsibilities under the NRP" and
NIMS.); DHS PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 7, at 24 (noting overlap between IIMG and Home-
land Security Operations Group and the lesson learned that "the role of the IIMG needs better defini-
tion."); GAO PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS, supra note 7, at 14 ("During our initial fieldwork, we
found examples of how an incomplete understanding of NRP and NIMS roles and responsibilities could
lead to misunderstandings, problems, and delays.").
75. FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 7, at 137.
76. Id. at 137-38.
77. Id. at 139.
78. Id.
79. See Gordon, supra note 9, at 191.
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that the implementation of a program built on federalist principles was the
problem. The federal response to Hurricane Katrina was a result of human
errors, not failed philosophical concepts. Such failures do not, without
more, justify jettisoning a longstanding federalist framework.
Similarly, it is not clear that the federal government lacked the neces-
sary authority to act in response to Katrina. The investigations overwhelm-
ingly focused not on the federal government's want for power, but on its
failure to implement existing authority under the Stafford Act or National
Response Plan-such as failure to convene or appoint appropriate officials/
entities or to invoke the Catastrophic Incident Annex. The focus of these
criticisms suggests that the federal government had ample ability to act and
that much of the government's failures regarding Katrina resulted from
confusion and lack of coordination rather than a shortage of power.
Of course, the scope of the federal government's power may require
clarification. For example, federal officials claim that the Catastrophic In-
cident Annex applies only in situations where there is little or no notice of
impending catastrophe; thus, they did not invoke it with Katrina-a situa-
tion which evolved over time.80 As others note, however, while drafters of
the NRP may have contemplated using the Catastrophic Incident Annex
primarily in short or no notice situations, nothing in the NRP's definition of
catastrophe limits the Catastrophic Incident Annex to such situations. 81
Nevertheless, the apparent confusion regarding the scope of the govern-
ment's power certainly argues for clarification-perhaps even on a legisla-
tive level. The General Accounting Office made such a recommendation
as early as 1992 after Hurricane Andrew.82 What this situation does not
appear to require, however, is further centralization of authority at the fed-
eral level, as at least one report specifically concluded: "Implementing a
push system ... does not require federalization of the disaster or usurping
of state authority. Although a push system is a proactive response by the
federal government, it still requires notification and full coordination with
the state."83
To their credit, federal officials have acknowledged many of the criti-
cisms raised in the reports and are attempting to rectify the problems.84 In
fact, the federal government has reiterated the importance of federalism
and the retention of state and local authorities as first responders in most
instances.85  But in one significant area-control over the National
Guard-the federal government has sought and received centralized au-
thority. The White House prodded Congress to amend the Insurrection
80. FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 7, at App. 7 (Letter from Philip J. Perry, General Coun-
sel, Department of Homeland Security, to J. Keith Ausbrook, Esq., Chief Counsel, House Select Bipar-
tisan Committee on Katrina (Feb. 8, 2006)).
81. Id. at 131-32.
82. GAO PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS, supra note 7, at 12-13 (discussing recommendation that
Congress consider giving federal agencies authority to act proactively in catastrophic disasters).
83. FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 7, at 136.
84. See generally TOWNSEND, supra note 4.
85. Id. at 67.
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Act to give the President authority over National Guard troops in times of
national disaster (which are normally under the control of the governor of
each state). 86 Not surprisingly, state governors strongly opposed such fed-
eralization, arguing that the proposed law "'violates more than 200 years of
American history' . . . [and is] part of a larger federal effort to make states
'satellites of the national government.' "87 The Bush administration, how-
ever, apparently believed this measure was necessary to rectify some of the
problems associated with its response to Hurricane Katrina.
The investigations conducted after Katrina do not support the govern-
ment's argument for greater presidential authority over the National
Guard. The bipartisan congressional committee, for example, acknowl-
edged that there were significant coordination problems between federal
military and National Guard troops.88 However, the committee did not
conclude that those problems arose because federal troops lacked sufficient
centralized authority over National Guard troops (although the committee
admitted to struggling with that issue during its investigation).89 Rather,
the committee identified as the sources of problems such things as the Sec-
retary of Defense's belated response in placing National Guard assets on
Title 32 status (which leaves them under the control of the governors but
permits uniform administration);9" federal officials' lack of insight into
state National Guard capabilities (which led to lack of trust and mutual
understanding);91 failure of DOD and DHS adequately to define for State
National Guard units the nature of appropriate military assistance to civil-
ian authorities;92 DOD's lack of situational awareness of conditions in the
affected states;93 and the military's lack of necessary personnel, training,
86. See supra note 5. The Insurrection Act already gives the President authority to invoke mili-
tary troops to keep order if insurrection or domestic violence is threatened. See 10 U.S.C. § 333 (2000)
(prior to the amendment). The recent amendment, however, specifically gives the President the author-
ity to call up the National Guard in times of natural disaster. Id. (2006).
87. Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Congress Debates Giving White House Broader Authority over Na-
tional Guard, Foxnews.com, Sept. 14, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,213889,00.html.
88. FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 7, at 201-31.
89. Id. at 15-16.
90. Id. at 207. The Secretary of Defense did not place the National Guard on that status until
September 7 despite repeated requests by state governors as early as September 2.
91. Id. at 221-22. The bipartisan committee specifically found in this instance that "federalism
played out in Louisiana" as part of a scenario in which Governor Blanco refused President Bush's offer
of having Army Lieutenant General Russell Honor6 serve in a dual capacity as leader of Joint Task
Force Katrina and a member of the Louisiana National Guard, thus making him commander of federal
troops answering to the President and commander of the Louisiana National Guard troops answering
to Governor Blanco. Id. at 206-07, 222. The committee noted that this dual response may have slowed
the "active military response and contributed to tension in the state-federal relationship." Id. at 222.
Even here, however, the bipartisan committee noted that the failure of "DOD, governors, and other
state officials to actively participate in joint planning for emergencies . . . [also] contributed to the
tension." Id. Furthermore, the committee noted that Honor6 was not familiar with emergency proce-
dures and personnel in affected states, and thus his appointment "would not necessarily have added
anything to the response." Id. Most significantly, the committee did not conclude that presidential
control over the National Guard was a necessary aspect of improving the military's slow response.
92. Id. at 221-22.
93. Id. at 223-24.
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and communications equipment.94 As with the other problems identified
above, these are not issues that inherently result from the lack of central-
ized authority, but rather from human error associated with implementa-
tion of a system built on federalism. Nothing suggests that jettisoning the
existing framework of federalism is necessarily the correct remedy to such
problems.
The Bush administration's response to Hurricane Katrina does, how-
ever, highlight some of the potential perils of cooperative federalism pro-
grams. On the one hand, having multiple levels of government provide
disaster relief and response services may be both necessary and beneficial
in that it provides a protective redundancy. 95 But such benefits do not al-
ways occur. Critics of cooperative federalism programs argue that their
format of "shared political responsibility" make it increasingly difficult for
citizens to "finger the culprits for government ... train-wrecks."96 In a
sense, when everyone is responsible, no one is responsible, and it becomes
difficult to know which government officials are at fault for problems that
result from cooperative federalism programs. As a result, officials can
more easily shift blame-a phenomenon that was reflected in the federal
government's response to Katrina.
The cooperative federalism at the core of disaster relief and response
efforts allowed the federal government to focus blame elsewhere rather
than on its own failings. Although ultimately unsuccessful on many levels,
the White House succeeded in convincing the House and Senate to pass
legislation giving the President authority over the National Guard in cer-
tain circumstances involving natural disasters.97 There is little evidence
that such a law is necessary or justified by the events that unfolded during
Katrina. In fact, most of the investigatory findings suggest the opposite.
But the Bush administration was able to point to Governor Blanco's re-
fusal to voluntarily allow federal military officials to command Louisiana
National Guard troops to bolster its claim that federalism hindered the fed-
eral government's response.98 Despite the fact that myriad other problems
94. Id. at 225-27.
95. Robert A. Schapiro, Justice Stevens's Theory ofInteractive Federalism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
2133, 2142 (2006).
96. Greve, supra note 12, at 567; see also Schapiro, supra note 95, at 2142-43.
97. See John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-
364, 120 Stat. 2083 (2006), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.R.5122. Professor
Greenberger argues that the new law does not grant the President additional authority but, rather,
merely clarifies authority the President already had. Michael Greenberger, Yes, Virginia: The President
Can Deploy Federal Troops to Prevent the Loss of a Major American City from a Devastating National
Catastrophe, 26 Miss. C. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2007). As a practical matter, Professor Green-
berger's argument may well be true. Domestic violence often accompanies catastrophic national disas-
ters and the Insurrection Act provided for presidential control in such cases prior to the recent
amendments. See supra note 86. If so, such a change in the law would be little more than the kind of
clarification referred to above. See text accompanying note 80. But the debate regarding the amend-
ments did not proceed along these lines, instead focusing on where power ought to be located as a
matter of history and principle, thus reflecting the manner in which abstract concepts of cooperative
federalism can infect potentially useful discussion.
98. See supra note 91 for a discussion of this incident.
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led to the ineffective military response, including poor preparation and ex-
ecution by federal officials, the ability to legitimately claim that federalism
was at fault eased the bill's passage through Congress.
The events of Hurricane Katrina may also reflect the concerns of those
who fear that cooperative federalism programs will concentrate authority
in the federal government. 99 There is little question that state and local
governments implement national policy regarding disaster response and
rescue. In fact, the federal government makes clear the importance of hav-
ing a national policy,' 00 especially via such tools as the NRP. To be sure,
states and localities have some discretion to implement that plan, but con-
ditional funding grants require fairly rigid adherence to federal stan-
dards.101 Furthermore, state and local authorities had little input into the
original development of the NRP. 102 As the federal government increas-
ingly focused disaster response on terrorism after 9/11,103 coupled with its
enlarged law enforcement and surveillance powers generally, one could
rightfully wonder whether concerns regarding federal concentration of
power had merit.
Perhaps the problem here is that cooperative federalism programs do
not implicate the concept of federalism or, more specifically, that such a
term is not helpful in describing the relationship between the federal, state,
and local governments. This is not intended to imply that one should dis-
pense with the relationships that tend to represent what we think of as
cooperative federalism. The substantial benefits of the arrangements
known as cooperative federalism, coupled with their significant longev-
ity,1°4 suggest they are here to stay.0 5 But the term federalism is not help-
ful here-especially given the lack of agreement generally regarding what
that term means. 106 At best, the word "federalism" adds nothing to the
substantive discussion regarding the failures of various government offi-
cials in response to Katrina. At worst, it obfuscates the discussion. Profes-
sors Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley have noted that "claims of
federalism are often nothing more than strategies to advance substantive
positions or, alternatively, that people declare themselves federalists when
they oppose national policy, and abandon that commitment when they
99. See supra note 24.
100. See supra note 46.
101. Abbott, supra note 40, at 845.
102. Id. After state and local authorities objected to their exclusion, DHS established a task force
that included state and local stakeholders who participated in drafting a revised NRP. Id. at 846-47.
103. Id. at 847.
104. Symposia referencing cooperative federalism can be found as early as 1938. See Symposium
on Cooperative Federalism: Foreword, 23 IOWA L. REV. 455 (1938).
105. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on National Neurosis, 41
UCLA L. REV. 903, 933 (1994) ("Whether one regards our political system as cooperative, competitive,
or simply a mess-whether it resembles marble cake or mush-there is little doubt that state and na-
tional powers overlap, and that national policy is regularly implemented by state officials.").
106. See supra note 79.
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favor it.' ° 7 Similarly, the emptiness and manipulability of the term coop-
erative federalism allow people to support or oppose the concept while
actually having substantive agendas as their primary reasons for acting.
Reliance on federalism as one's primary argument conceals the real reason
for action and short circuits beneficial discussion.
V. CONCLUSION
Cooperative federalism programs, like those involved in disaster relief
and response, are neither all good nor all bad. They simply are what they
are. As with Hurricane Katrina, whether they are successful depends
largely on their implementation. In assessing such programs, one would do
well to focus more on their details and less on amorphous concepts. Hurri-
cane Katrina suggests that the framework established for disaster response
and relief - one based on a framework of cooperative federalism - broke
down because of implementation failures and not because anything in the
system was inherently flawed. We may need to tweak aspects of this sys-
tem, possibly resulting in some centralization of federal authority. But
those decisions should be made with an understanding of what actually
went wrong with the Katrina disasters rather than as a result of empty fed-
eralism rhetoric.
107. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 105, at 948.
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